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Contribution and Indemnity Among Joint
Tortfeasors in Illinois: A Need For Reform
RICHARD A. MICHAEL*
NINA S. APPEL**
Illinois traditionally has not allowed a right of contribution be-
tween joint tortfeasors. This harsh common law doctrine, which
permits a plaintiff to proceed to judgment against one of several
joint tortfeasors and denies that defendant any claim against other
joint tortfeasors, originated in 1799 when Lord Kenyon declared
that he had "never before heard of such an action having been
brought, where the former recovery was for a tort."' In that case a
joint judgment had been rendered against two defendants, who to-
gether had converted plaintiff's goods. Lord Kenyon expressly
stated that the decision "would not affect cases of indemnity where
one man employed another to do acts not unlawful in themselves."
Later English cases followed Kenyon's reasoning and prohibited
contribution only when plaintiff was a conscious and wilful wrong-
doer.
Originally American courts also restricted the rule to cases of
wilful misconduct. As an early Massachusetts judge stated:
No one can be permitted to relieve himself from the consequences
of having intentionally committed an unlawful act, by seeking an
indemnity or contribution from those with whom or by whose au-
thority such unlawful act was committed. But justice and sound
policy ...alike require, that it should not be extended to cases
where parties have acted in good faith . . . .It is only when a
person knows, or must be presumed to know that his acts were
unlawful, that the law will refuse to aid him in seeking an indemn-
ity or contribution.2
Eventually, however, the great majority of American courts aban-
doned this distinction and extended the prohibition to negligent
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1. Merryweather v. Nixon, 8 Term. Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
2. Jacobs v. Pollard, 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 287, 288-89 (1852).
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tortfeasors. 3 When liberalization of joinder rules permitted a plain-
tiff to join several defendants whose independent, albeit concurrent,
acts of negligence had contributed to a single injury, the rule was
extended even further and contribution was denied these "joinable"
defendants as well.4 Illinois adopted the English rule of no contribu-
tion in 18561 and expanded it to include both negligent and concur-
rent tortfeasors.1
Few commentators have had a good word for the prohibition
against contribution,7 cognizant of the potential for inequities inher-
ent in its enforcement. The rule has been criticized as an anachron-
ism dating back to a time when tortfeasors were akin to criminals,
and courts therefore reluctant to permit wrongdoers to use the
courts for their own relief.' This reluctance was accomapnied by a
fear that an undue amount of judicial time and energy would neces-
sarily be expended in making decisions concerning degrees of culpa-
bility among civil wrongdoers? But however discredited the under-
lying rationale may be, the prohibition continues in full force in
Illinois.
To alleviate the harsh results implicit in the rule, Illinois courts
creatively have expanded the concept of indemnity beyond its com-
mon law definition. While at common law indemnity was given, as
Lord Kenyon indicated, to a defendant held liable without personal
fault, Illinois in some cases permits recovery by a party not com-
pletely free from fault.
A right to indemnification may arise by contract, or may be cre-
ated by law. The courts of Illinois have permitted both types of
indemnity. This article analyzes and evaluates the various devices
by which such recovery has been permitted.
CONTRACTUAL INDEMNIFICATION
Contractual indemnification agreements are effective in permit-
ting potential joint tortfeasors to decide among themselves how
losses are to be allocated in the event of joint liability. These in-
3. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 50, at 306 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
4. Id. § 46, at 295-98.
5. Nelson v. Cook, 17 Ill. 443 (1856).
6. Wanack v. Michels, 215 Ill. 87, 74 N.E. 84 (1905) (dictum). See also Sargent v. Inter-
state Bakeries, Inc., 86 Ill. App. 2d 187, 196, 229 N.E.2d 769, 774 (1967). For the remainder
of this article, the term "joint tortfeasor" conforms to the Illinois usage.
7. James, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARV. L. REV.
1157 (1941).
8. ILL. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ANN. 1 RE. 117 (1964) (unanimous resolution favoring contri-
bution among joint tortfeasors).
9. Reese v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 55 Ill. 2d 356, 303 N.E.2d 382 (1973).
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demnity contracts have caused few problems when the intention of
the parties is manifest, but the indemnity provision will not be
construed as indemnifying one against his own negligence unless
such construction is required by clear and explicit language of the
contract, or such intention is expressed in unequivocal terms.', In
1971 the Illinois General Assembly invalidated all such provisions
in construction contracts on public policy grounds." This interdic-
tion has been broadly construed. In Davis v. Commonwealth Edison
Co.,'" an architect, sued for a Structural Work Act'3 violation, filed
a cross-claim for indemnification based on a contractual provision
against the general contractor. The provision stated that the con-
tractor would "pay all claims or judgment for any injuries whether
caused by Bonesz's [the architect] negligence or not, arising out of
the construction . . . including all claims or judgments under the
Illinois Structural Work Act."' 4 The Illinois Supreme Court struck
the claim for indemnification. The court disposed of the contention
that the statute is invalid on the basis of equal protection or special
legislation in that it is limited to construction contracts by stating:
The burden of demonstrating that a classification is unreasonable
or arbitrary is upon the person attacking the validity of the classifi-
cation . . . we consider there are sufficient differences between the
industry affected . and others to form a reasonable basis for the
classification. 15
The court further held that in addition to clauses providing for
indemnification from one's own negligence the "legislative intend-
ment" was that the statute render invalid clauses by which a party
seeks indemnification for its possible future liability under the
10. Tatar v. Maxon Constr. Co., 54 Ill. 2d 64, 294 N.E.2d 272 (1973).
11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, §§ 61 et seq. (1975). The statute applies only to contracts
executed after the statutory effective date, September 23, 1971, and provides:
61. Indemnification of Person from Person's Own Negligence-Effect-
Enforcement. With respect to contracts or agreements, either public or private,
for the construction, alteration, repair or maintenance of a building, structure,
highway, bridge, viaducts or other work dealing with construction, or for any
moving, demolition or excavation connected therewith, every covenant, promise or
agreement to indemnify or hold harmless another person from that person's own
negligence is void as against public policy and wholly unenforceable.
62. Application of Act. This Act applies only to contracts or agreements entered
into after its effective date.
63. Construction Bonds or Insurance Contracts-Application of Act. This Act
does not apply to construction bonds or insurance contracts or agreements.
12. 61 111. 2d 494, 336 N.E.2d 881 (1975).
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 60-69 (1975).
14. 61 111. 2d at 496, 336 N.E.2d at 882.
15. Id. at 498, 336 N.E.2d at 883-84.
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Structural Work Act."6 In American Pecco Corp. v. Concrete
Buildings Supply Co., 17 the court broadly interpreted "construction
contract" as used in the statute to include what purported to be a
lease of a crane and its operator for construction purposes.
In other cases it has been held that the indemnity clause will not
be construed to indemnify one against the proximate results of what
he has expressly ordered another to do" and it has long been the law
in Illinois that a party may not seek contractual indemnification for
his own intentional torts.'"
Since the greater includes the lesser, it follows that in any case
where the parties might provide for indemnification by contract,
they could also provide for contribution or "partial" indemnifica-
tion. It remains to be determined whether a construction contract
providing for contribution for a liability incurred through a party's
own negligence will also be held to be unenforceable under the stat-
ute.
But contractual indemnification is available only in those rela-
tively few situations where the parties both foresee potential future
joint liability, and are willing to allocate losses between themselves
in advance of their occurrence. Clearly, most situations where the
no contribution rule may cause inequitable results must be reme-
died, if they are to be remedied by indemnification at all, by a
legally created implied right of indemnification.
IMPLIED INDEMNIFICATION
At common law indemnity was implied, in the absence of con-
tract, in favor of a defendant who was vicariously liable against the
person whose fault caused the injury. As was stated by the court in
Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co. :20
There are many exceptions to the general principle of noncontribu-
tion between tortfeasors recognized by the courts of this and other
states and by the federal courts. The exceptions to the rule are
embraced in four or five general groups. One is that a city has a
right of action against contractors or abutting owners for liability
which the city may have incurred to third persons for breach of its
duty with respect to public ways. . . The rule has been applied
16. Id. at 502, 336 N.E.2d at 886.
17. 392 F. Supp. 798 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
18. St. Joseph Hosp. v. Corbetta Constr. Co., 21 Ill. App. 3d 925, 946-47, 316 N.E.2d 51,
66-67 (1974).
19. John Griffiths & Son Co. v. National Fireproofing Co., 310 Il. 331, 141 N.E. 739
(1923).
20. 343 Ill. App. 148, 152-54, 98 N.E.2d 783, 785-86 (1951) (citations omitted).
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in nonmunicipal cases where the negligence of an outsider was the
active cause of an injury and created the liability . . . [Clases
where a stranger is hurt by a subcontractor or subtenant and the
contractor or owner is given a right of action against the subcon-
tractor . . .[Clases where one, supplying goods or services, by his
active negligence caused the liability . . .[Clases where the neg-
ligence of a third party caused a liability under the Federal Em-
ployer's Liability Act ....
In addition, indemnity has been applied in favor of an employer
held liable for the negligence of his employee2 and where an owner's
liability arose because of the act of a lessee or lessor.22
The courts in Illinois found indemnity to be a useful device in
alleviating the inequities caused by the no contribution rule. As the
court indicated in the Dixon case:
The vast growth of negligence law has markedly changed the char-
acteristics of negligence actions. Legal negligence no longer em-
bodies a concept of misbehavior just short of the criminal or the
immoral. The courts have, therefore, had to find a way to do justice
within the law so that one guilty of an act of negligence-
affirmative, active, primary in its character-will not escape scot-
free, leaving another whose fault was only technical or passive to
assume complete liability.23
However, determination of whether conduct will be considered
''active" or "passive" is not a matter of proceeding according to
usual dictionary terms. It must be recognized at the outset that no
precise definition can be formulated that will reconcile the many
Illinois cases.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in classic understatement, recog-
nized that ". . .[tjhese terms have not attained precise judicial
definition . . .",24 Further, in Moody v. Chicago Transit Authority, '2
the court stated:
These words are terms of art and they must be applied in accord-
ance with concepts worked out by courts of review upon a case by
case basis. Under appropriate circumstances, inaction or passivity
in the ordinary sense may well constitute the primary cause of a
mishap or active negligence . . .It has been appropriately stated
21. Embree v. Gormley, 49 11. App. 2d 85, 199 N.E.2d 250 (1964).
22. Blaszak v. Union Tank Car Co., 37 111. App. 2d 12, 184 N.E.2d 808(1962); Mierzeiwski
v. Stronczek, 100 I1. App. 2d 68, 241 N.E.2d 573 (1968).
23. 343 Ill. App. 148, 156, 98 N.E.2d 783, 787 (1951).
24. Carver v. Grossman, 55 Ill. 2d 507, 511, 305 N.E.2d 161, 163 (1973).
25. 17 I1. App. 3d 113, 307 N.E.2d 789 (1974).
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that mere motion does not define the distinction between active
and passive negligence.2"
In Garfield Park Community Hosp. v. Vitaco,27 the plaintiff was
sharply elevated and left in traction for eleven days on the orders
of his treating physician. The plaintiff sued the hospital which
sought indemnification from the doctor. The court found that the
hospital nurses, though fully aware of the dangerous condition did
nothing, and stated:
Under the legal definition adopted by the courts in indemnity
cases, this complete inaction and passivity by the Hospital staff
was active negligence and thus, by court definition, the primary
cause of the mishap to the patient 3
Once it is recognized that mere motion is not the differentiating
factor, and that the courts are doing more than attaching labels to
conduct, it becomes necessary to seek out the underlying rationale
of the distinction. The Illinois Supreme Court has formulated the
test as follows:
[A] tortfeasor may seek to impose indemnity upon another wrong-
doer if there exists a qualitative distinction between the negligence
of the two tortfeasors.21
The mandate to Illinois courts, then, is clear: compare the wrongs
of the tortfeasors to determine whether the necessary "qualitative
distinction" exists. If not, indemnity must be denied. To determine
what the courts have done to carry out this mandate, it is instructive
to examine those cases not based on negligence, in which indemnity
has been granted or denied on other grounds.
In Dram Shop Act 30 cases, the parties responsible under the Act
may not seek indemnification from the intoxicated person whose
actions caused the injuries complained of because this would violate
the public policy underlying the Act. This public policy has been
defined as providing a basis for the "discipline of dramshop opera-
tors and owners for their indiscriminate sale of liquor and the evils
resulting therefrom." 3' The cost accruing for violation of the statute
must be borne by those profiting from the sale of liquor to the
public, thus, as a matter of law, the conduct of the dramshop's
26. Id. at 117, 307 N.E.2d 792-93.
27. 27 Ill. App. 3d 741, 327 N.E.2d 408 (1975).
28. Id. at 749, 327 N.E.2d at 413.
29. Harris v. Algonquin Ready Mix, Inc., 59 Ill. 2d 445, 449, 322 N.E.2d 58, 60 (1974).
30. ILL. Rsv. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1975).
31. Wessel v. Carmi Elks Home, Inc., 54 Ill. 2d 127, 295 N.E.2d 718 (1973).
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owner may never be considered as "secondary." Similarly, it has
been held that the liabilities imposed on the owner and operator of
the dramshop are strictly based upon statute. The statute makes no
qualitative distinction between the actions of owning and serving,
thus each "must be considered an active wrongdoer under that stat-
ute, regardless of the comparative passive nature of that conduct
relative to the conduct of another statutory obligor." 2
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in accordance
with the minority position33 has held that the public policy underly-
ing the Workman's Compensation Statute34 does not preclude the
party whose "passive" conduct rendered him liable to the injured
party from seeking indemnification from the injured party's em-
ployer in excess of the employer's statutory liability, if the em-
ployer's conduct was the "active" cause of the injury. A case which
both exemplifies this principle and is indicative of the situations in
which the courts will imply a duty of indemnification in Structural
Work Act cases is Miller v. DeWitt.3 5 In that case, plaintiffs were
injured when a roof on which they were working as employees of the
general contractor collapsed. They brought suit against the archi-
tect and the owner under the Structual Work Act. These defendants
attempted to join the contractor as a third party defendant on
grounds of implied indemnity. The court held that the third party
complaint stated a cause of action.
The supervising architects and owners who were liable because
they were technically "in control" of the premises and knew or in
the exercise of ordinary care could have known of the dangerous
condition, were allowed a right of indemnification against the con-
tractor who had actually constructed the defective roof. The Court
stated:
[Allthough the liability imposed by the Act does not rest on negli-
gence there can be degrees of fault among those who under the Act
are accountable to an injured plaintiff ....
Neither can escape liability to the [injured] plaintiff-thus the
purpose of the Act is accomplished-but the lesser deliquent, if
held accountable to the plaintiff, can transfer its statutory liability
to the active deliquent whose derelection from duty brought about
plaintiff's injury.36
32. Hardin v. Desideri, 20 Ill. App. 3d 590, 601, 315 N.E.2d 235, 243 (1974).
33. See cases collected at Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 977 (1957).
34. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 138-138.28 (1975).
35. 37 I1. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967).
36. Id. at 291-92, 226 N.E.2d at 642.
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Similarly, difficult policy questions have arisen in products liabil-
ity cases based on strict liability in tort. It has long been the law
that a party whose liability arose under strict liability because of a
defective product was entitled to indemnification from those in the
distributive chain who supplied the product to him." As the Illinois
Supreme Court explained,
One of the basic grounds supporting the imposition of strict liabil-
ity upon manufacturers is that losses should be borne by those who
have created the risk and reaped the profit by placing the product
in the stream of commerce . . . A wholesaler or retailer who
neither creates nor assumes the risk is entitled to indemnity. 3
However, indemnity has been denied if sought by the manufacturer
of the defective product against a party whose negligence was more
proximate in the chain of distribtuion to the ultimate consumer. In
denying the manufacturer, (Louden) indemnity from the allegedly
negligent employer of the injured plaintiff the Illinois Appellate
Court noted:
. . . despite the inapplicability of the theory of "active-passive
negligence", Louden is indeed asking us to compare apples with
oranges and to create another exception to the policy against con-
tribution between joint tortfeasors by holding that the tort of strict
liability is a less culpable fault than the tort of ordinary negligence
in terms of degree of social fault. Such an assessment has already
been made adversely to Louden's position. 9
In Stanfield v. Medalist Industries,4" the plaintiff-employee's
hand was partially amputated by a machine she was operating for
the first time. She filed suit against the defendant manufacturer of
the machine, alleging that the machine was defective and unreason-
ably dangerous because it was not equipped with a shield; no ade-
quate warning had been given by the manufacturer. The manufac-
turer filed a third party complaint against the employer, alleging
that the employer had been actively negligent in failing to instruct
or supervise the employee, while the negligence on the manufac-
turer's part was merely passive. The court denied the right of the
manufacturer to be heard, explaining that:
37. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Il1. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Texaco v. McGrew
Lumber Co., 117 Ill. App. 2d 351, 254 N.E.2d 584 (1969).
38. Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chev., 61 111. 2d 17, 20, 329 N.E.2d 785, 786-87 (1975).
39. Kossifos v. Louden Machinery Co., 22 I1. App. 3d 587, 592, 317 N.E.2d 749, 752
(1974).
40. 17 I1. App. 3d 996, 309 N.E.2d 104 (1974).
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[T]he basis of liability is the putting into the stream of commerce
of a defective and dangerous product and the liability proceeding
therefrom is not based on ordinary negligence but is based on the
consideration of protecting the public from such products . . . . It
appears that the liability in these cases is qualitatively active so
far as the seller or manufacturer is concerned and because of his
unique relationship to the product as its creator his negligence
cannot be offset against that of a mere subsequent user . . . third
party actions for indemnity against a subsequent user are not
maintainable by the manufacturer or seller of the defective prod-
uct.,,
However, it has been held in Illinois that the fact that a manufac-
turer has been sued on a theory of strict liability for a defective
product does not preclude a third party action by him against the
plaintiff's employer, whose active negligence in the modification
and altered use of the product allegedly was the proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injuries.42
In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Williams Machine Tool Co.,13
the Illinois Supreme Court had occasion to consider these questions.
The plaintiff sought indemnity as subrogee for its insured, Charles
Machine Works (Charles). Charles had settled suits arising from the
collapse of an adjustable work platform (the Skywitch) assembled
by Charles, and designed to hydraulically raise loads not exceeding
2000 pounds to heights up to 24 feet. The power to raise the Sky-
witch was generated by a pump, manufactured by the defendant
and installed without alteration by Charles. Each pump was
equipped with a relief valve, allowing defendant to halt pressure if
the Skywitch encountered an obstruction or had excess weight
placed on it while being raised.
The accident occurred when one corner of the Skywitch to which
additional scaffolding had been added tipped over and became ob-
structed by a projection on the building against which it was being
used. A failure of the relief valve permitted excessive pressure to be
released, binding the rods of the platform and causing its collapse,
with resulting injuries to the workmen using it.
In the indemnity action, defendant claimed that misconduct of
the plaintiff's insured in failing to warn the user of the Skywitch
that its planned addition of scaffolding to the platform could cause
it to tip over was either active negligence or, alternatively, misuse
of the product. Defendant urged that either type of misconduct was
41. Id. at 999-1000, 309 N.E.2d at 107-08.
42. Kuziw v. Lake Engineering Co., 385 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. I1. 1974).
43. 62 Il. 2d 77, 338 N.E.2d 857 (1975).
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a concurrent cause of the accident, and since compensation to an
injured consumer was not involved in this action between two man-
ufacturers, indemnity between the two "joint tortfeasors" be de-
nied. The court rejected this argument in the following terms:
The major purpose of strict liability is to place the loss caused by
defective products on those who create the risk and reap the profit
by placing a defective product in the stream of commerce, regard-
less of whether the defect resulted from the "negligence" of the
manufacturer. We believe that this purpose is best accomplished
by eliminating negligence as an element of any strict liability ac-
tion, including indemnity actions in which the parties are all man-
ufacturers or sellers of the product."
The court went on, however, to state:
While we do not agree with the defendant's argument that "ac-
tively negligent" conduct on plaintiff's part is sufficient to bar
indemnification, we do not intend to imply that a plaintiff's mis-
conduct could never preclude recovery. In our judgment, indem-
nity here and elsewhere in the chain of distribution is not avail-
able to one whose conduct in connection with the product may be
read to constitute a misuse of it or an assumption of the risk of its
use. While the policy reasons movitating our adoption of strict
liability in Suvada are somewhat less persuasive here, where we
are concerned with ultimate liability as between those in the
manufacturer-distributor chain, they are sufficient, in our judg-
ment, to warrant application of the same recovery barring stand-
ards (misuse assumptions of the risk) as we determined in Wil-
liams ought to preclude recovery by users .... 15
The court found no reason for Charles, as the assembler, to have
been aware of any defect in the relief valve; therefore he had not
assumed the risk. There was no misuse of the product since it was
not used "for purpose neither intended nor foreseeable."4 The pres-
ence of the relief valve itself was held to be demonstrable proof that
excessive loading or obstruction were foreseeable. The judgment for
the plaintiff was therefore affirmed.
Turning from the area of products liability to an area of statutory
liability which, like the Structural Work Act, is based on fault, in
Chicago and Illinois Midland Ry. Co. v. Evans Constr. Co.," an
employee of the railroad, in the course of his employment, stepped
44. Id. at 82, 338 N.E.2d at 860.
45. Id. at 83, 338 N.E.2d at 860.
46. Id.
47. 32 Ill. 2d 600, 208 N.E.2d 573 (1965).
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down from a moving box car and stumbled over an old railroad tie
which lay across the rails of adjoining tracks, falling and sustaining
injuries. He asserted a claim against the plaintiff under the Federal
Employees Liability Act. 8 The railroad settled this claim and then
brought an action for indemnification against the owner of the
premises on which the accident had occurred. A judgment for the
plaintiff was appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, which re-
versed, stating:
In the present case the plaintiff was not the usual business invitee,
but Was one which, in the conduct of its hazardous operations, was
subject to a non-delegable statutory duty to provide a safe place
for its employees to work. That duty was no less stringent than the
duty of the defendant as the owner of the premises."
Earlier in the opinion the court had said in addressing the merits
of plaintiff's claim:
The difficulty with this position is that there is no proof as to how
the tie came to be where it was when the accident occurred, or how
long it had been there. The evidence supports the inference drawn
by the trial court that the tie that caused the injury was one of the
discarded ties belonging to the defendant, but it goes no further.
The tie was a standard tie and weighed about 150 pounds. There
is no evidence which suggests that the defendant or any of its
employees placed the tie on the tracks, and there is no evidence
which suggests that the defendant knew that it was there. In the
language of the Restatement, the evidence does not show that the
dangerous condition was created by the defendant. The breach of
duty relied upon to shift the entire cost of the injury from the
plaintiff to the defendant must therefore be the defendant's failure
to discover and remove the tie, a failure to see that the premises
were safe for the work that was to be done. But exactly that same
duty rested upon the plaintiff.2
It is possible to discern a general trend from these decisions. The
search for "qualitative distinction" necessary before a court implies
the right to indemnity in favor of a tortfeasor not totally free of fault,
has involved balancing the social reprehensibility involved in the
behavior of the two tortfeasors. At its extremes this concept is easily
perceived and applied. As the Illinois Supreme Court noted in
Davis,
48. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq. (1970).
49. 32 I1. 2d 600, 608, 208 N.E.2d 573, 577 (1965).
50. Id. at 605-06, 208 N.E.2d at 576.
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[A]n agreement to indemnity against wilful misconduct would, as
a general rule, be contrary to public policy and unenforceable
51
In St. Joseph Hospital v. Corbetta Const. Co.,52 the court indi-
cated that a fraudulent party will not be entitled to indemnity from
one who was merely careless. It is submitted that the principle is
the same when nonintentional torts are involved, albeit its applica-
tion is less obvious and more difficult to articulate.
A tavern owner may not be indemnified by the intoxicated person
whose acts caused the injury; a manufacturer of a defective product
may not seek indemnity from an employer who negligently used the
product. In each case the court has decided that the social policy
creating the liability has precluded indemnification.
On the other hand, in Structural Work Act cases, the court has
stated there are "degrees of fault" 3 among defendants and the lesser
deliquent can transfer its statutory liability "to the active delin-
quent, whose derelection from duty" 4 caused the injury. Thus in
light of the public policy underlying this legislation the contractor
who negligently built the scaffold is considered more culpable than
the architect who knew or should have known of its condition.
Similarly, in strict products liability cases policy demands that
the party who created the risk and reaped the profit by placing the
product in the stream of commerce should bear the loss. A whole-
saler or distributor who neither created nor assumed the risk may
be indemnified by the manufacturer. The manufacturer is not enti-
tled to indemnity when the employer of the injured party was
merely negligent, but will be indemnified when the employer mis-
used the product. It is significant that misuse by the injured party
himself would be a defense to the manufacturer's liability. 55
Finally, a railroad liable under the F.E.L.A. has no right of in-
demnification based on the alleged negligence of the landowner
when the basis of the liability of both tortfeasors arises from a simi-
lar act, i.e., failure to inspect the premises to insure their safety as
a place of work.
The analysis of relative culpability on the part of the tortfeasors
based on the policy underlying the liability of each is much more
difficult to apply in cases of ordinary negligence. If both tortfeasors
are negligent, their social fault would appear at first glance to be
51. Davis v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 61 111. 2d at 500-01, 336 N.E.2d at 885.
52. 21 111. App. 3d 925, 946-47, 316 N.E.2d 51, 66-67 (1974).
53. Miller v. DeWitt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 291, 226 N.E.2d 630, 642 (1967).
54. Id. at 292, 226 N.E.2d at 642.
55. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970).
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equal and it would follow that a different approach to implied in-
demnity is called for. The cases, however, have failed to articulate
this distinction. Indeed, in Chicago and Illinois Midland Ry. Co. v.
Evans Constr. Co.," the F.E.L.A. case, the court declared:
[Ilt is necessary to draw a qualitative distinction between the
negligence of the two tortfeasors if the action for indemnity is to
succeed.57
While the language of the F.E.L.A. states that negligence is a re-
quirement for the railroad's liability, case interpretations have so
weakened this requirement that in fact the railroad was subject to
a "non-delegable" statutory duty to provide a safe place for its
employees to work. It is submitted that if the other party had negli-
gently created a dangerous condition which the railroad merely
failed to discover, the railroad would be entitled to indemnification.
As the court in Evans stated:
In these cases the dangerous condition that caused the injury was
created by the defendant and plaintiffs negligence amounted to no
more than the failure to discover and remedy it. Section 95 of the
Restatement of Restitution is as follows: "Where a person has
became [sic] liable with another for harm caused to a third person
because of his negligent failure to make safe a dangerous condition
of land or chattels, which was created by the misconduct of the
other or which, as between the two, it was the other's duty to make
safe, he is entitled to restitution from the other for expenditures
properly made in the discharge of such liability, unless after dis-
covery of the danger he acquiesced in the continuation of the
condition." 8
It may be noted that the right of indemnification recognized in
Miller59 is supportable under this theory.
There are two Illinois Supreme Court cases where the liability of
each defendant was predicated on negligence. Significantly, in each
case, indemnity was denied.
In Carver v. Grossman0 a customer in a service station switched
on his ignition when the proprietor asked him to "check the gas."
As he did so, the car lurched forward injuring a station employee
who sued the customer's estate. The administrator of the estate filed
56. 32 11. 2d 600, 208 N.E.2d 573 (1965).
57. Id. at 603, 208 N.E.2d at 574.
58. Id. at 604-05, 208 N.E.2d at 575.
59. 37 Ill. 2d 273, 266 N.E.2d 630 (1967). See text accompanying notes 35 through 37
supra.
60. 55 Ill. 2d 507, 306 N.E.2d 161 (1973).
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a third party claim against the station proprietor on the grounds
that the customer's conduct had been passive in that he was only
following instructions. The court refused to categorize the cus-
tomer's fault as "passive" because he knew or should have known
that his car would start when he turned on the ignition, and by
doing so he violated the duty he owed the employee:
This cannot be characterized as passive negligence so that he can
totally escape responsibility for his wrongful act. If [the cus-
tomer] was guilty of active negligence he is not entitled to indemn-
ity whether [the proprietor's] negligence is termed active or pas-
sive.'
The second Illinois Supreme Court decision denying indemnity
between two negligent tortfeasors was Harris v. Algonquin Ready
Mix Inc."2 The plaintiff employee was severely injured when a
nearby crane transmitted an electrical charge from an uninsulated
power line owned by Commonwealth Edison. Plaintiff sued both
Edison and the landowner for negligence. Edison cross-claimed for
indemnification against the landowner. In holding this cross-claim
invalid, the Illinois Supreme Court stated:
The parties herein do not question prevailing law which holds that
a tortfeasor may seek to impose indemnity upon another wrong-
doer if there exists a "qualitative distinction between the negli-
gence of the two tortfeasors." (Chicago and Illinois Midland Ry.
Co. v. Evans Construction Co., 32 Ill. 2d 600, 603, 208 N.E.2d 573,
574.) The various decisions related to the question have allowed
indemnity to a tortfeasor whose misconduct is "passive" compared
to the other tortfeasor's wrongdoing which is "active" in nature.
(Carver v. Grossman, 55 Ill. 2d 507, 511, 305 N.E.2d 161.) In the
present case, Edison has conceded that it had a duty to warn
plaintiff or Pre-Cast of the danger, and it has argued that Algon-
quin had the same duty. In Carver v. Grossman, we said at page
513, 305 N.E.2d at page 164, "this court [has] held that in light
of the fact that both tortfeasors owed the plaintiff the same duty
which they both breached, there could be no total shifting of re-
sponsibility from one to the other." Thus even assuming arguendo
the validity of Edison's position in relation to the introduction of
the prior accident involving Pre-Cast, Edison's action against Al-
gonquin for indemnity was improper.3
While no Illinois Supreme Court decision has allowed a claim of
61. Id. at 514, 305 N.E.2d at 164.
62. 59 Ill. 2d 445, 322 N.E.2d 58 (1974).
63. Id. at 449, 322 N.E.2d at 60-61.
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indemnification where the liability of both tortfeasors was based on
negligence, the same is not true of the Illinois Appellate Court. Most
appellate court cases have denied liability on "primary" and "sec-
ondary" cause analysis predicated on the definitions in the Carver
case. Thus, in Garfield Park Community Hosp. v. Vitaco, 4 the court
denied indemnity on the ground that the inaction of the hospital
staff was the "primary cause" of the injury. Similarly, in Moody v.
Chicago Transit Authority,5 the court denied a claim for indemnifi-
cation when plaintiff was injured as a bus swerved around an ille-
gally parked truck. The court stated:
[I]naction or passivity in the ordinary sense may well constitute
the primary cause of a mishap or active negligence . . . .The
contributions of both parties to cause the mishap were of equal
significance. There is no "qualitative distinction between the neg-
ligence of the two" counterclaimants . . . .The conduct of each
was "the primary cause or active negligence.""
Some appellate court decisions, however, have allowed one alleg-
edly negligent tortfeasor to be indemnified by the other. In Reynolds
v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. 7 the plaintiff, who had been struck in a
crosswalk by a passing motorist, sued the defendant whose truck
had been parked illegally for two hours. The appellate court held
that defendant's third party complaint against the motorist stated
a cause of action for indemnity.
The court reasoned that "the jury might find that the motorist's
act in speeding and failing to yield right of the way were the primary
causes of the injury ..."" Reynolds was cited and followed in
Sargent v. Inter State Bakeries Inc. ,69 a case strikingly similar on its
facts. Again a defendant whose liability was predicated on having
illegally parked its vehicle was permitted to file a counterclaim
against the defendant whose car struck the plaintiff. The court de-
fined passive negligence as failure "to act in fulfillment of a duty of
care . . ." and active negligence as participation "in some manner
in conduct or omission which caused the injury."7
These cases went beyond those decided at the supreme court
level, which appear to be limited to Restatement situations where
the "active" tortfeasor has created a dangerous situation, capable
64. 27 Il1. App. 3d 741, 327 N.E.2d 408 (1975).
65. 17 Ill. App. 3d 113, 307 N.E.2d 789 (1974).
66. Id. at 117, 307 N.E.2d at 793.
67. 51 111. App. 2d 334, 201 N.E.2d 322 (1964).
68. Id. at 336, 201 N.E.2d at 323.
69. 86 Ill. App. 2d 187, 229 N.E.2d 769 (1967).
70. Id. at 193, 229 N.E.2d at 772.
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of causing the injuries, and the "passive" tortfeasor has merely
failed to discover it. While it may be said that the reckless driver is
more socially reprehensible than one who parks illegally, it can also
be contended that since the liability of both is founded in negligence
the necessary "qualitative distinction" needed to permit indemnity
is missing.
Focus on this critical issue has been obscured in recent cases by
the controversy over the necessity of a pre-tort relationship between
the parties.
Reynolds was the first case in Illinois to permit indemnity be-
tween joint tortfeasors who were strangers prior to the accident.
Spivak v. Hara7' without reference to Reynolds decided that such a
pre-tort relationship was necessary. In 1967 the Sargent court
stated:
It is true that the Reynolds decision did add a further dimension
to the right of one negligent tortfeasor to recover indemnity from
another. Generally, recovery had theretofore been allowed only in
cases where the liability of the defendant seeking indemnity was
derived from the defendant from whom indemnity was sought and
the defendants had some community of interest in their relation-
ship to the plaintiff which antedated the liability-creating incident
• . .Under one analysis of Illinois cases, a pre-tort relationship
between negligent tortfeasors provides a necessary substratum for
implying an agreement that the one tortfeasor would perform the
duties imposed by the relationship without subjecting the other to
liability . . . .However, the right to indemnity stands upon the
principle that everyone is responsible for the consequences of his
own acts.7"
Reviewing the criticism levied against the strict rule of disallow-
ing contributions, and the efforts of Illinois courts to alleviate the
harsh results, the court went on:
If the rule is not abrogated it must be further relaxed. There can-
not be rigid compliance with the rule without continuing injus-
tices. Indemnity should not be limited to situations where there is
derivative liability upon the third-party plaintiff by reason of oper-
ation of law, or where there has been a preaccident relationship
with the third-party defendant. The law must be attuned to social
developments and degrees of fault must be recognized which will
permit indemnification from tortfeasors substantially at fault to
those less blameworthy."
71. 69 Ill. App. 2d 22, 216 N.E.2d 173 (1966).
72. 86 I1. App. 2d at 190, 229 N.E.2d at 771 (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 198, 229 N.E.2d at 775.
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Then in 1968, in Muhlbauer v. Kruzel,74 the Illinois Supreme Court
affirmed the dismissal of a third party complaint as a matter of law.
The plaintiff sued a grocery store proprietor (Kruzel) for injuries
sustained when plaintiff was injured while a member of a crowd
attracted to the store by a promotional clown. The proprietor denied
he had hired or caused the clown to be present, and filed a third
party complaint against the supplier of the product sold in the store
(Wilson), alleging that the clown had been hired by the supplier to
promote its product. The court dismissed the complaint, stating:
We recongize that the policy of section 25(2) can be frustrated by
a rigid and formal approach to the pleadings; nevertheless, a third
party complaint must disclose some relationship upon which a
duty to indemnify may be predicated. To establish such a relation-
ship between Wilson and himself, Kruzel, in his statement of facts
in this court, augments the allegations of his pleadings by adopting
the view of the trial judge that the clown was acting for the benefit
of both Kruzel and Wilson, and was present to induce customers
to come into Kruzel's store. If those facts had been alleged by
Kruzel it would be possible to discern potential relationships that
would support a duty on the part of Wilson to indemnify Kruzel.
But no such facts were alleged, and, as the appellate court pointed
out, the "amended third party complaint demonstrates no rela-
tionship or circumstance" that would give rise to a duty to indem-
nify. Kruzel's effort appears to have been to divorce himself com-
pletely from any connection with Wilson. His pleadings do not
admit that he sold a product distributed by Wilson. The only
allegations that suggest that the two are not complete strangers
state:
"If the wrongful acts alleged to have been performed by third
party plaintiff were in fact performed by third party plaintiff,
which third party plaintiff has denied in his answer, said acts of
third party plaintiff were passive acts only and not active. *** If
third party plaintiff is held liable for the injuries alleged in the
complaint, it will not be on account of any wrongful acts, but will
be on account of the active wrongful acts of third party defen-
dant." Section 43 of the Civil Practice Act permits alternative or
hypothetical averments of facts, but this hypothetical allegation
asserts only the pleader's conclusion as to legal characterizations,
without any facts to support that conclusion.75
Since Muhlbauer, there has been a division of opinion in the
appellate court regarding the necessity of a pre-tort relationship
74. 39 Il. 2d 226, 234 N.E.2d 790 (1968).
75. Id. at 231-32, 234 N.E.2d at 793 (citations omitted).
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between the parties. In Mullins v. Crystal Lake Park District," the
plaintiff was injured when fireworks, stolen from the defendant Park
District and given to plaintiff by the thief, exploded. The Park
District's claim to indemnity against the thief was upheld at the
pleading stage by the court citing Reynolds and Sargent with ap-
proval:
The more recent authorities in this State have recognized that
although there is no contractual or quasi-contractual relationship
between the parties, a cause of action may be stated when two or
more parties are alleged to have been involved in causing injury
to a third person, entitling the party whose conduct is merely
passive or secondary in the sense of culpability to indemnity
against the party whose negligence is the active or primary cause
of the injury . . .
Although the pleadings were dismissed for failure to allege any
relationship or circumstances connecting the parties in Muhlbauer
v. Kruzel, . . . the Supreme Court recognized that the doctrine of
implied indemnity exists if a potential relationship between the
parties is pleaded and the liability of one party is primary and the
other is secondary. Here, the counterplaintiffs do not deny any
connection with Stokes. They allege that Stokes stole the fireworks
from that display and admit that the fireworks taken from the
display were given to plaintiff and caused his injury. We believe
that this sufficiently alleges the relationship or circumstances be-
tween the parties sufficient upon which to predicate an action for
indemnity."
On the other hand, in Village of Lombard v. Jacobs,78 the injured
plaintiff had been rear-ended at an intersection where there was an
alleged "dense fog" caused by the defendant village's efforts to
spray the area with insecticide for mosquitoes. The Village then
sought indemnification from the individual defendant on the theory
that a municipality held liable solely on the basis of its duty to
maintain its roads has a right to indemnity from the party whose
act caused the injury. The court denied the Village the relief sought.
Commenting on Muhlbauer, the court stated:
[T]he court did strongly indicate that there would be no indemni-
fication between two tortfeasors, even where one is passive and the
other active, if they were complete strangers."
76. 129 I1. App. 2d 228, 262 N.E.2d 622 (1970).
77. Id. at 231-32, 262 N.E.2d at 624-25 (citations omitted).
78. 2 I1. App. 3d 826, 277 N.E.2d 758 (1972).
79. Id. at 831, 277 N.E.2d at 761.
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In Moody v. Chicago Transit Authority,"' the majority dismissed
the counterclaim on the ground that neither tortfeasor could be
considered "passively" negligent. However, Justice Hallet, in con-
currence, stated that in his view Muhlbauer overruled the "no prior
relationship cases" by implication when "it affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of a third party complaint for indemnity because
such a complaint . . . 'must disclose some relationship upon which
a duty to indemnify may be predicated.' ""
In Warzynski v. Village of Dolton,12 plaintiff, a passenger in the
individual defendant's car, was injured when the car hit a protrud-
ing sewer cover on a dark street. The Village's claim for indemnifica-
tion against the driver was denied. The court first noted that the
Village had to establish the necessary "measurable difference in the
degree of fault," stating:
We believe that the negligence of the Village in allowing the sewer
on an unlighted street to be raised above street level was at least
equal to the negligence of Novak as he drove in darkness over the
said sewer and can only be viewed as an active or affirmative
participation in the injury.13
However, the court went on to add that
Furthermore . . . here, there is lacking any pre-tort relationship
between Novak and the Village and, under the authority of Muhl-
bauer, the verdict against Novak cannot stand."
It is submitted that those appellate courts which have interpreted
Muhlbauer to require a pre-tort relationship between the tortfeasors
before indemnity will be allowed to have unnecessarily extended the
scope of that decision well beyond the facts of the case. It must be
recalled that in the Muhlbauer case the third party complaint al-
leged that the food processor, not the grocery store proprietor, had
hired the clown. The supreme court held that this allegation did not
state a cause of action for indemnification. This is clearly correct;
if proved, this allegation would merely establish that the grocery
store proprietor was not liable. A defendant who alleges he is not
liable cannot by a third party action bring the person he deems
liable into the action. In essence, the grocer pleaded a defense,
80. 17 I1. App. 2d 113, 307 N.E.2d 789 (1951).
81. Id. at 118, 307 N.E.2d at 793.
82. 23 II. App. 3d 50, 317 N.E.2d 694 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, __ Ill. 2d __
338 N.E.2d 25 (1975).
83. Id. at 59, 317 N.E.2d at 700-01.
84. Id.
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rather than a right to indemnification."' Within this context it is
clear that the court's statements that "a third party complaintmust
disclose some relationship upon which a duty to indemnify may be
predicated '86 and "the amended third party complaint demon-
strates no relationship or circumstance that would give rise to a duty
to indemnify '8 7 need not be interpreted as requiring a pre-tort rela-
tionship between the parties.
Essential to a cause of action for indemnity is that the pleader
assert facts establishing his right to indemnity. First, he must admit
liability and secondly, he must assert facts showing his right to
reimbursement. This, of course, may be pleaded in the alternative
together with a complete denial of liability, but it must nevertheless
be pleaded. The remarks of the supreme court may easily be inter-
preted to signify that the pleadings simply were insufficient in fail-
ing to state any factual situation upon which a duty to indemnify
may be predicated. Active-passive negligence might well be such a
circumstance or relationship even absent a "pre-tort" relationship.
This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that the court in
Muhlbauer stated that if the third party plaintiff had alleged that
the clown was acting for the benefit of both the processor and the
proprietor:
It would be possible to discern potential relationships that would
support a duty on the part of Wilson (the processor) to indemnify
Kruzel (the proprietor). But no such facts were alleged . . .
Kruzel's effort appears to have been to divorce himself completely
from any connection with Wilson . . . . The only allegations that
suggest that the two are not complete strangers state: "if the
wrongful acts alleged to have been performed by third party plain-
tiff were in fact performed by third party plaintiff which third
party plaintiff had denied in his answer, said acts of third party
plaintiff were passive acts only and not active . . . ." This hypo-
thetical allegation asserts only the pleader's conclusion as to legal
characterizations without any facts to support that conclusion."
Thus it would seem that if facts supporting these conclusions had
been pleaded the necessary relationship to support a right to indem-
nify would have been established, even though no "pre-tort" rela-
tionship was alleged. It must be noted that the court in Muhlbauer
cited Reynolds and Sargent with approval on the issue of the diffi-
85. See also Burke v. Sky Climber Inc., 57 I1. 2d 542. 546, 316 N.E.2d 516, 518 (1974).
86. 39 I1. 2d at 232, 234 N.E.2d at 793 (1968).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 231-32, 234 N.E.2d at 793.
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culty of determining from the pleadings that no right of indemnifi-
cation exists as a matter of law. Also it is significant that the court
in Chicago and Illinois Midland Ry. Co. v. Evans Constr. Co. 9 cited
with approval Section 95 of the Restatement of Restitution which,
where applicable does not require a pre-tort relationship. Finally, in
reversing the Warzynski case on other grounds the Illinois Supreme
Court stated:
• . . we have no occasion to consider the question of Novak's obli-
gation to indemnify the Village. The fact that we do not discuss
this issue does not indicate approval of the Appellate Court con-
cerning it."
The Illinois Supreme Court has yet to provide a definite answer
to the precise issue of the necessity of a pre-tort relationship, and
where it has spoken regarding such a requirement it has been gener-
ally, if cryptically, negative.
The question remains as to whether such a pre-tort relationship
should be required before indemnity will be implied. To the extent
that the purpose of extending implied indemnity to situations where
the potential defendants are all at fault to some degree is to avoid
the harshness of the no contribution rule, no reason exists to so limit
the relief a court may provide. Clearly such harshness may equally
occur in situations involving total strangers. To restate the problem:
is the implied duty to indemnify implied "in fact" or "in law"? If
the duty is implied in fact then it is true that a pre-tort relationship
is essential to lay the basis for implying in fact the promise of one
tortfeasor to indemnify the other. If however, as the authors believe
and as the Restatement of Restitution indicates, the duty to indem-
nify is implied in law, then no such pre-tort relationships need be
required, and those who have chosen this as the basis for opposing
the Reynolds line of decisions may be unnecessarily restricting the
right of indemnity.
The Reynolds, Sargent and Mullens cases may well be opposed,
not because of the absence of a pre-tort relationship but because the
necessary "qualitative distinction" between the wrongful conduct of
the defendant and that of the joint tortfeasor necessary to imply a
duty of indemnification in law was lacking. This, of course, is the
basic issue which emphasis on the requirement of a pre-tort rela-
tionship has obscured. The alleged basis of liability of all the defen-
dants in these cases was negligence, and the only two cases9 in
89. 32 Ill. 2d 600, 208 N.E.2d 573 (1965).
90. Warzynski v. Village of Dolton, - Ill. 2d __, 338 N.E.2d 25, 29 (1975).
91. Carver v. Grossman, 55 11. 2d 507, 305 N.E.2d 161 (1973); Harris v. Algonquin Ready
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which the Illinois Supreme Court encountered negligence on the
part of joint tortfeasors denied indemnification on the ground that
the necessary "qualitative" distinction was missing. Evans indi-
cated that even when both defendants are negligent this necessary
distinction may be present if the active defendant creates a danger-
ous condition and the passive tortfeasor merely fails to discover and
remedy it.
In Reynolds, Sargent, and Mullens the situation was different. It
was the allegedly passive tortfeasor who had created the condition,
in itself incapable of creating injury, but which nevertheless pro-
vided the opportunity for the allegedly active tortfeasor to cause the
injury.
Indemnification may be opposed in these cases on the grounds
that since both tortfeasors were negligent, the degrees of social culp-
ability of negligent parties should not be compared, and the relative
importance of the negligence of each in bringing about the injury
could not be weighed once it is determined that the negligence of
each was sufficiently proximate to warrant liability. In other words,
Illinois courts should not adopt comparative negligence for appor-
tioning responsibility between joint tortfeasors based on the all or
nothing basis of indemnity.
The Illinois Supreme Court cases directly on point or closely re-
lated are not conclusive. Miller v. DeWitt92 exhibited classic nondis-
covery of the dangerous condition and indemnification was allowed.
In Harris v. Algonquin Ready Mix, Inc."3 and Chicago and Midland
Ry. Co. v. Evans Constr. Co.," the failure of both tortfeasors was a
breach of the identical duty and indemnity was denied. Carver v.
Grossman15 is the most analogous case-the alleged liability of both
the defendant car operator and defendant garage owner was
negligence, yet the court did not state that indemnity should never
be allowed in such situations, but merely that indemnity should not
be permitted on the facts of that case. There was little if any differ-
ence in the social culpability of the actions of the two defendants.
The court noted that in cases permitting indemnity, the conduct of
the passive party has been characterized as the "secondary" cause
of the injury. Here, however, the car owner knew, or should have
known, his car would start when he turned the ignition key, so that
Mix, Inc., 59 I1. 2d 445, 322 N.E.2d 58 (1974).
92. 37 111. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967).
93. 59 II. 2d 445, 322 N.E.2d 58 (1974).
94. 32 II. 2d 600, 208 N.E.2d 573 (1965).
95. 55 I1. 2d 507, 305 N.E.2d 161 (1973).
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the situation created by [the garage owner] at the very least re-
quired the active violation by [the car owner] of the duty which
he owed [to the plaintiff] in order to cause the injury. This cannot
be characterized as passive negligence so that he [the car owner]
can totally escape responsibility for his wrongful act."
It is submitted that in resolving this issue, the courts must deter-
mine whether it is socially desirable to impose a duty of full indem-
nification on a joint tortfeasor when both tortfeasors are guilty of
negligence but a significant difference exists between the wrongs of
the two, both in terms of their relative social culpability and in
terms of their proximity in the chain of the causation of the injury.
In accordance with this approach, it may be argued that the activ-
ity of the speeding or reckless driver is more socially culpable than
that of the negligent parker, e.g., Reynolds and Sargent, and that
the actions of the thief are more culpable than the merely negligent
storage of explosives, e.g., Muliens. In each of these cases, the act
of the "active" tortfeasors was also a more significant factor in
causing the injury. It is submitted that all three cases were therefore
correctly decided, but that cases which fall within their stringent
rationale will be rare indeed.
EQUITABLE INDEMNIFICATION
While the lower courts were striving to refine the concept of
active-passive negligence, the Illinois Supreme Court in 1973 de-
cided the case of Gertz v. Campbell." In Gertz, plaintiff was struck
by a car driven by defendant, who filed a third party claim against
plaintiff's treating physician alleging malpractice in the treatment
of plaintiff. The third party complaint sought recovery only for the
amount of damage caused plaintiff "as a result of the new injury or
aggravation of the plaintiff's existing injuries caused by the neglect
and failure"" of the doctor. The trial court dismissed the third party
complaint, but the Illinois Supreme Court held that it stated a
cause of action. The actual holding, however, is quite narrow. First,
the court emphasized that allowing the third party complaint to
stand did not violate the Illinois rule against contribution because
here the driver and doctor were not joint tortfeasors. The driver was
liable for the injuries resulting from the doctor's alleged malpractice
under the concept of proximate cause, but the doctor could not be
held liable for the original injuries inflicted by the driver. Further-
96. Id. at 514, 305 N.E.2d at 164.
97. 55 Ill. 2d 84, 302 N.E.2d 40 (1973).
98. Id. at 86, 302 N.E.2d at 42.
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more, the court emphasized that in seeking partial recovery for his
liability, the driver did not violate established principles of indemn-
ity, since he sought full indemnification for the entire amount of
damages attributable to the fault of the doctor.
The case is significant nevertheless, and the full extent of its
holding has yet to be determined. First, it permitted partial indem-
nification of one tortfeasor by another on other than a contractual
basis. Second, it implied a duty for partial indemnification on a
basis other than "active-passive" fault. Third, it allowed partial
indemnification without pre-tort relationship; and finally it permit-
ted partial indemnification between two tortfeasors whose liability
was founded in negligence. These last two points lend further sup-
port to the position previously espoused in this article99-namely
that no public policy in Illinois requires existence of a pre-tort rela-
tionship before indemnification will be permitted, and that in a
proper case, indemnity will be implied by law even though both
tortfeasors have been negligent.
The first two aspects of the Gertz case-the very allowance by the
court of partial indemnification and the granting of indemnification
on a basis other than active-passive negligence-require further
consideration. Of course, partial indemnification is essentially con-
tribution; in a sense, then, Gertz is the first case in Illinois to permit
contribution among multiple tortfeasors. Such contribution was
permitted, however, in a factual context where the damage allocable
to each tortfeasor was identifiable and separable. The court permit-
ted the partial indemnification on equitable considerations rather
than active-passive misconduct. It remains to be seen whether the
Gertz doctrine will be extended beyond the situation where the
plaintiff's injuries are divisible and specifically allocable to the neg-
ligence of each tortfeasor. While the question cannot be definitely
answered until the supreme court again considers the issue, two
factors indicate that this concept may well be so extended. First,
Justice Underwood's concurring opinion in Gertz noted the uncer-
tainty of "equitable apportionment" and proposed that the same
result could be reached, as indeed has been done in other states, by
allowing the original tortfeasor to be subrogated to the plaintiff's
rights against his doctor. 00 The existence of this concurrence con-
firms that the court considered this approach and rejected it in favor
of "equitable indemnification."
99. See text accompanying notes 71 through 96 supra.
100. 55 II. 2d at 93-94, 302 N.E.2d at 45-46.
[Vol. 7
Contribution And Indemnity
Even more significantly, the court commented on the doctor's
contention that in Illinois indemnity is permitted only where there
is an express or implied contract of indemnity or where there exists
a "qualitative distinction" between the negligence of the two tort-
feasors, stating:
[We] do not consider that the right to indemnity must be unalter-
ably restricted to the outlines he has described. The right should
be capable of development to meet perceived requirements for just
solutions in questions involving multiple tortfeasors. The historical
aversion of courts to compare the fault of tortfeasors when contri-
bution or indemnity has been sought has not prevented them from
developing concepts which allowed indemnity when equity re-
quired. As an example, courts came to contrast the faults of an
active tortfeasor with that of a passive one and to allow indemnity
to the less culpable offender. And to illustrate there can and should
be a continuing search for better solutions, the Court of Appeals
of New York has recently supplanted this active-passive negligence
criterion for indemnity with one founded on equitable principles.
Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.1"
This reference to the New York case of Dole v. Dow Chemica1
0 2
with apparent approval is startling. In Dole an employee was as-
signed to clean a grain storage bin shortly after it had been sprayed
with a fumigant manufactured by Dow. His exposure to the fumi-
gant caused his death. In the wrongful death case Dow was sued for
negligence in failing to properly label the fumigant and failure to
warn users of its dangers. Dow filed a third party action against the
employer (Urban) on an active-passive theory alleging that the
employer failed to take proper precautions, used untrained person-
nel, failed to follow instructions on the label and failed to test and
aerate the premises after fumigation. The Appellate Division dis-
missed the third party complaint on the grounds that Dow's negli-
gence in mislabeling and insufficient warning, if established by the
plaintiff, would be active negligence and would therefore preclude
Dow from recovery against the user of the product, albeit the user
also was negligent. 0 3
The Court of Appeals reversed. After noting Dow's negligence was
"active" the court said:
101. Id. at 89, 302 N.E.2d at 43-44.
102. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288 (1972).
103. 35 A.D.2d 149, 316 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1970).
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But the policy problem involves more than terminology. If indem-
nification is allowed at all among joint tortfeasors, the important
resulting question is how ultimate responsibility should be distrib-
uted. There are situations when the facts would in fairness warrant
what Dow here seeks-passing on to Urban all responsibility that
may be imposed on Dow for negligence, a traditional full indemni-
fication. There are circumstances where the facts would not, by the
same test of fairness, warrant passing on to a third party any of
the liability imposed. There are circumstances which would justify
apportionment of responsibility between third-party plaintiff and
third-party defendant, in effect a partial indemnification.' 0
Tracing the development of the New York rule against contribu-
tion, the court stated:
This process in practical application became a measure of degree
of differential culpability, although the degree was a large one. The
"passive" negligent act was treated by the court as less a wrong
than the "active" negligent act. The result has been that there has
in fact emerged from the statutory change and from the judicial
decisions an actual apportionment among those who participate
responsibly in actionable torts."''
The court therefore concluded that henceforth;
Right to apportionment of liability or to full indemnity, then, as
among parties involved together in causing damage by negligence,
should rest on relative responsibility and to be determined on the
facts.""
This decision is far broader than Gertz. It permitted equitable
indemnity, where damages were not divisible nor specifically alloca-
ble to each defendant, based on the relative responsibility of the
multiple tortfeasors. If Dole were to be followed in Illinois, the
"active-passive" doctrine would be replaced by a principle under
which the court could allow either full or partial indemnity when-
ever equity so required. This approach clearly eliminates the harsh-
ness of the no contribution rule. It avoids the limitation of indemni-
fication which forces the court to grant all-or-nothing relief and
thereby requires the court to find a very real difference in the quality
of wrongs involved before relief may be granted. The weakness of the
solution lies in the lack of standards for its application.
104. 30 N.Y.2d at 146, 282 N.E.2d at 291.
105. Id. at 148, 282 N.E.2d at 292.
106. Id. at 151, 282 N.E.2d at 295.
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SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
The inequities inherent in the common law prohibition against
contribution have been discussed. 07 It should come as no surprise
that the rule has been abandoned by the great majority of jurisdic-
tions.
Contribution is currently permitted in England by statute, 5 and
in 38 American states.""5 The rapid expansion of the doctrine of
comparative negligence has had a profound impact on contribution
as well. Thirty-one American states have adopted comparative neg-
ligence: 28 by statute;"0 and three-Florida,"' California," 2 and
Alaska"'-by judicial decision. While comparative negligence
refers only to the negligence of the plaintiff as opposed to that of the
defendant, principles of relative fault may be extended to suits
among defendants. It has been argued that if comparative negli-
gence is to fulfill its role of apportioning damages on the basis of
fault the same principles must extend to tortfeasors," 4 and in the
absence of statutory provision two courts have so ruled." ' Of the 31
107. See text accompanying notes 7 through 9 supra.
108. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 50, at 306n.43.
109. See LAUFENBERG, PRIMER ON COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (Defense Research Institute
1975) 26 [hereinafter cited as D.R.I.]. Jurisdictions are collected and classified in Note, 68
YALE L.J. 964, 981-84 (1959). 25 of 31 comparative negligence states currently permit contri-
bution, as do 13 of 19 contributory negligence states. D.R.I., supra this note, at 26.
110. D.R.I., supra note 109, at 7n.4 listing the following statutes. The date in brackets is
the year of adoption. Arkansas, ARK. STAT.. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to 27-1765 [1955]; Colorado,
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-14 [1971]; Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38-324 [19731;
Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 94-703, 105-603 [1913]; Hawaii, HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-31
[1969]; Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 6-801 to 6-806 [1971]; Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
258a [1974]; Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 [1965]; Massachusetts, MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 [1969]; Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 [1969]; Mississippi,
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-5 [1919]; Montana, MONT. STAT. § 58-607.1 [1975]; Nebraska, NEB.
REV. STAT. § 25-1151 [1913]; Nevada, NEV. LAWS § 41.141 [1973]; New Hampshire, NH REV.
STAT. ANN. § 507.7a [1969]; New Jersey, NJ STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:15-5.1 to 2A:15-5.3 119731;
North Dakota, ND CENT. CODE § 9-10-107 [1973]; New York, NY CPLR art. 14-A, § 1411
[19751; Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 11-12 [1973]; Oregon, ORE. REV. STAT. §
18.470 [1971]; Rhode Island, RI GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-20-4 [1972]; South Dakota, SD CoMe.
LAWS § 20-9-2 [19411; Texas, TEX. VERNON'S CIV. STAT. art. 2212a, §§ 1, 2 [1973]; Utah,
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37 to 78-27-43 [1973]; Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036
[1970]; Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 4.22.010 [1974]; Wisconsin, WiS. STAT. § 895.045
[19311; Wyoming, Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 1-7.2 [1973].
111. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
112. Ngali v. Yellow Cab of California, 13 Cal. 2d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226
(1975).
113. Kaatz v. State of Alaska, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975).
114. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 16.7, at 260 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
SCHWARTZ].
115. Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962); Packard v. Whitten, 274
A.2d 169 (Me. 1971).
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comparative negligence states, only six continue to deny contribu-
tion,"' five permit contribution by equal division,"7 and the remain-
ing 20 permit contribution on principles of pure relative fault. It is
interesting to note that while 24 states permit only modified com-
parative negligence in suits brought by plaintiff, permitting recov-
ery only if plaintiffs negligence is "less than" that of the defendant
(49 percent) or "no greater than" his formula (50 percent formula),
no state denies contribution on the ground that the claiming defen-
dant is more negligent than the other defendant. To do otherwise
could be to deny recovery, to a more negligent, hapless defendant
solely because plaintiff had proceeded to judgment against him
first; the possibilities of collusion are obvious, particularly in intra-
family suits, and this limitation has therefore been everywhere re-
jected."'
Of the 19 states which still adhere to contributory negligence
principles,"' 13 now permit contribution among joint tortfeasors,
two under principles of relative fault whether or not the defendant
has been joined by the plaintiff,2 " and 11 under the principle of
equal division.'2 There are six contributory negligence states which
continue to deny contribution among joint tortfeasors, and Illinois,
116. D.R.I., supra note 109, at 26n.188 listing: Colorado, Bradford v. Bendix-
Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Co., 33 Col. App. 99, 517 P.2d 406 (1973); Connecticut,
Kaplan v. Merberg Wrecking Corp., 152 Conn. 405, 207 A.2d 405 (1964); Florida, Kellenberger
v. Widener, 159 So. 2d 267 (Fla. App. 1963); Nebraska, Tober v. Hampton, 194 Neb. 858,
136 N.W.2d 194 (1965); Oklahoma, National Trailer Convoy, Inc. v. Oklahoma Turnpike
Authority, 434 P.2d 238 (Okla. 1967); Washington, City of Tacoma v. Bonnell, 65 Wash. 569,
118 P. 648 (1911).
117. Id. at 26n.189, listing: Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 105-2011, 105-2012 (1973); Massa-
chusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231B (1969); Mississippi, Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-5
(1973); Oregon, ONE. REV. STAT. § 18.440 (1971); Rhode Island, RI GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 10-6-1
to 10-6-11 (1972).
118. SCHWARTZ, supra note 114, § 16.9, at 271.
119. These states are: Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia and Louisiana.
120. Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6301-08 (1975); and Iowa, see, e.g., Best v.
Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 33 (1956).
121. Seven jurisdictions allow an action for contribution from a joint tortfeasor, whether
joined by plaintiff or not: Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT. § 412.030 (1973); Maryland, MD. ANN.
CODE art. 50, §§ 16-24 (1973); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-1-11 to 24-1-16 (1973);
North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-240 (1973); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§§ 2082-89 (1973); Tennessee, see, e.g., American Cas. Co. v. Billingsley, 195 Tenn. 448, 260
S.W.2d 173 (1953); and Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 8-627 (1973).
Four jurisdictions allow an action for contribution only from a joint tortfeasor joined by
plaintiff: Louisiana, LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 3, §§ 2103-05; Michigan, MICH. STAT. ANN. §§
27.1683(1)-(4); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.060; and West Virginia, W.VA. CODE ANN. §§
5481-82.
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of course, is among this rapidly shrinking minority.'22
As indicated previously,'23 the rationale for not allowing contribu-
tion among joint tortfeasors has been a reluctance to allow wrong-
doers to use the courts for their own relief coupled with a fear that
too large a portion of the court's time would be used in defining the
degree of culpability of each wrongdoer. Under the present status
of the law in Illinois, the no contribution rule does not achieve these
purposes. In determining whether the wrong of the given tortfeasor
is active or passive and whether the doctrine of Gertz is applicable
the courts are granting relief to certain classes of "wrongdoers," and
judging from the number of recent appellate court decisions in this
area, an inordinate amount of judicial -time and energy is being
expended in this process.
Illinois stands presently at a crossroad. It must first be deter-
mined if the original rationale of the rule preventing contribution
outweighs its potential inequities. If the rationale is determined to
be still valid, definitive rules must be formulated regarding when
indemnity will or will not be permitted so as to prevent the use of
trial courts-and appellate courts-in deciding each claim on a case
by case basis. To avoid this excessive expenditure of judicial time,
the doctrine of active-passive fault, so troublesome and time con-
suming in application, should be restricted to situations where the
"passive" tortfeasor merely failed to discover the dangerous condi-
tion created by the "active" one. In light of Reynolds, Sargent and
Mullens the doctrine could also encompass those relatively rare sit-
uations where the "passive" tortfeasor created a potentially danger-
ous condition, but one which would not have resulted in any injury
without the negligent act of the active tortfeasor. Gertz should then
be restricted to cases where the injury to the plaintiff is divisible and
specific portions are allocable to the wrong of each tortfeasor.
If, on the other hand, it is believed that the inequities inherent
in the no contribution rule outweigh its benefits the rule should be
abandoned, as it has been in 38 states and in England. In that case,
a right of contribution should be recognized among multiple tortfea-
sors.
A right of contribution can be achieved either by statute or by
judicial decision. A legislative enactment appears more desirable in
this complex area since multiple problems may be thereby resolved
122. The remaining five states include Alabama, Arizona, Indiana, Ohio and South Caro-
lina.
123. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
124. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT (1939).
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harmoniously. The Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors
Act, either in its 1939 form'24 or in its 1955 revision'21 might well be
considered. If the General Assembly fails to act, or as an interim
measure until it does, the courts could expand Gertz to its full Dole
implications. The equitable principles which would determine when
such contribution would be allowed, and the basis of allocation,
would then be judicially resolved on a case by case basis.
It is submitted that the present uncertainty in Illinois law will
continue until a basic judgment is made regarding retention of the
policy underlying this eighteenth century prohibition. Once such
determination is accomplished, the method of implementing
change, if desired, can be specified and proper steps initiated. In the
interest of beleaguered judges who must continue to attempt to "do
justice within the law," such clarification is long overdue.
125. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT (1959).
